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Contrôles et équilibres, leadership politique et autonomie bureaucratique : Constats au sujet des banques nationales de développement

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  • Beichen HUANG
  • Tianyang XI
  • Jiajun XU

Abstract

Selon une opinion répandue depuis longtemps dans l'économie politique de la bureaucratie, la qualité de la gouvernance politique est le fondement des agences de développement de grande qualité. Cependant, la littérature existante ne rend pas compte de la manière dont le leadership politique façonne la capacité des agences de développement. Motivé par le décalage entre les institutions politiques formelles et la grande variation de la gouvernance bureaucratique dans la réalité, ce rapport soutient que la structure et la capacité de gouvernance des agences de développement dépendent de manière cruciale de l'interaction entre les contraintes institutionnelles formelles ancrées dans le système politique, et la force du leadership politique. Plus précisément, ni les contraintes institutionnelles ni un leadership fort ne garantissent à eux seuls un degré suffisant d'autonomie bureaucratique pour les agences de développement. Sans un leadership fort, les contrôles et l'équilibre institutionnels peuvent donner lieu à un nombre excessif de points de veto dans l'élaboration des politiques et miner l'autonomie bureaucratique. En l'absence d'un équilibre institutionnel approprié, l'autonomie et la capacité des agences de développement ont tendance à être compromises par le risque moral d'un leadership fort. Notre argument théorique prédit donc que les agences de développement font preuve d'une autonomie et d'une capacité fortes en présence à la fois d'un leadership fort et de contraintes institutionnelles. Nous utilisons un ensemble de données transnationales sur les banques nationales de développement pour tester cette théorie. Les résultats de la régression et les études de cas confirment cette théorie.Ce papier de recherche est publié dans le cadre des groupes de travail de l'International Research Initiative on Public Development Banks, et à l'occasion de la 14ème conférence internationale de recherche de l’AFD sur le développement.Réaliser le potentiel des banques publiques de développement pour atteindre les objectifs de développement durable, c’est l’ambition du programme de recherche lancé par l'Institut de la nouvelle économie structurelle de l'université de Pékin (INSE), et soutenu par l’Agence française de développement, la Fondation Ford et l’International Development Finance Club (IDFC).Consulter la synthèse pour un aperçu rapide de ce travail et des résultats de rechercheVisionner le pitch vidéo

Suggested Citation

  • Beichen HUANG & Tianyang XI & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Contrôles et équilibres, leadership politique et autonomie bureaucratique : Constats au sujet des banques nationales de développement," Working Paper 6fb72d50-b8e9-40a3-9021-8, Agence française de développement.
    • Handle: RePEc:avg:wpaper:fr11708
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