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Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements

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  • Yonatan Lupu

Abstract

Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible? Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms. Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation. Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide. Especially in treaty member‐states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression. By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decisions, I show that positive effects of human rights treaties increase when there are more legislative veto players.

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  • Yonatan Lupu, 2015. "Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(3), pages 578-594, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:3:p:578-594
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12178
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emily Hencken Ritter & Courtenay R. Conrad, 2016. "Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 449-475, December.
    2. Jillienne Haglund, 2019. "International institutional design and human rights: The case of the Inter-American Human Rights System," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(6), pages 608-625, November.
    3. Daniela Donno & Michael Neureiter, 2018. "Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 335-357, September.
    4. Beichen HUANG & Tianyang XI & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Contrôles et équilibres, leadership politique et autonomie bureaucratique : Constats au sujet des banques nationales de développement," Working Paper 6fb72d50-b8e9-40a3-9021-8, Agence française de développement.
    5. Kevin L. Cope & Charles Crabtree, 2020. "A Nationalist Backlash to International Refugee Law: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Turkey," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 752-788, December.
    6. Jin Mun Jeong & Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 194-217, January.
    7. Melissa Martinez, 2023. "Does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights affect the development of human rights norms in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala?," International Studies, , vol. 60(1), pages 91-112, January.
    8. Gulnaz Anjum & Adam Chilton & Zahid Usman, 2021. "United Nations endorsement and support for human rights: An experiment on women’s rights in Pakistan," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 462-478, May.
    9. Oliver Westerwinter & Kenneth W. Abbott & Thomas Biersteker, 2021. "Informal governance in world politics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-27, January.
    10. Beichen HUANG & Tianyang XI & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Checks and balance, Political Leadership, and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Evidence from National Development Banks," Working Paper 6fb72d50-b8e9-40a3-9021-8, Agence française de développement.

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