Optimal Government Regulations and Red Tape in an Economy with Corruption
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- Méndez, Fabio & Sepúlveda, Facundo, 2013. "Optimal Government Regulations And Red Tape In An Economy With Corruption," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 54(1), pages 51-77, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rajeev K. Goel, 2012.
"Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption,"
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- Goel, Rajeev K., 2008. "Regulatory bottlenecks, transaction costs and corruption : a cross-country investigation," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2008, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; optimal policy; red tape; regulations.;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2006-05-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-ICT-2006-05-27 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-05-27 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-05-27 (Regulation)
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