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When to Request Evidence?

Author

Listed:
  • Andres Espitia
  • Edwin Mu~noz-Rodr'iguez

Abstract

Appropriate decisions depend on information gathered beforehand, yet such information is often obtained through intermediaries with biased preferences. Motivated by settings such as testing and recertification in organ transplantation, we study the problem faced by a decision-maker who can only access costly information through an agent with misaligned preferences. In a dynamic framework with exogenous decision timing, we ask how requests for verifiable information (evidence) should be scheduled and their implications for the quality of attained choices. When the agent's incentives are ignored, evidence requests do not condition on previously reported information. However, such policies may be susceptible to strategic manipulation by the agent. We show that, in these cases, optimal requests should be biased: additional evidence is more likely to be sought when previous reports favor the agent's preferred outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Espitia & Edwin Mu~noz-Rodr'iguez, 2026. "When to Request Evidence?," Papers 2602.13879, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2602.13879
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    References listed on IDEAS

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