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Bribery, Secrecy, and Communication: Theory and Evidence from Firms

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  • Jafar M. Olimov

Abstract

This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.

Suggested Citation

  • Jafar M. Olimov, 2025. "Bribery, Secrecy, and Communication: Theory and Evidence from Firms," Papers 2502.10877, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2502.10877
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubolino, Enrico, 2023. "Does weak enforcement deter tax progressivity?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    2. Ray Fisman & Roberta Gatti, 2006. "Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    4. Malesky, Edmund J. & Nguyen, Thang V. & Bach, Thang N. & Ho, Bao D., 2020. "The effect of market competition on bribery in emerging economies: An empirical analysis of Vietnamese firms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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