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Counterparty credit limits: An effective tool for mitigating counterparty risk?

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  • Martin D. Gould
  • Nikolaus Hautsch
  • Sam D. Howison
  • Mason A. Porter

Abstract

A counterparty credit limit (CCL) is a limit imposed by a financial institution to cap its maximum possible exposure to a specified counterparty. Although CCLs are designed to help institutions mitigate counterparty risk by selective diversification of their exposures, their implementation restricts the liquidity that institutions can access in an otherwise centralized pool. We address the question of how this mechanism impacts trade prices and volatility, both empirically and via a new model of trading with CCLs. We find empirically that CCLs cause little impact on trade. However, our model highlights that in extreme situations, CCLs could serve to destabilize prices and thereby influence systemic risk.

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  • Martin D. Gould & Nikolaus Hautsch & Sam D. Howison & Mason A. Porter, 2017. "Counterparty credit limits: An effective tool for mitigating counterparty risk?," Papers 1709.08238, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1709.08238
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Craig, Ben & von Peter, Goetz, 2014. "Interbank tiering and money center banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 322-347.
    2. Rehlon, Amandeep & Nixon, Dan, 2013. "Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(2), pages 147-156.
    3. Martin D. Gould & Mason A. Porter & Stacy Williams & Mark McDonald & Daniel J. Fenn & Sam D. Howison, 2010. "Limit Order Books," Papers 1012.0349, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2013.
    4. Roll, Richard, 1984. " A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1127-1139, September.
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    7. Martin D. Gould & Mason A. Porter & Stacy Williams & Mark McDonald & Daniel J. Fenn & Sam D. Howison, 2013. "Limit order books," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(11), pages 1709-1742, November.
    8. Robert A. Jarrow & Fan Yu, 2008. "Counterparty Risk and the Pricing of Defaultable Securities," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Financial Derivatives Pricing Selected Works of Robert Jarrow, chapter 20, pages 481-515 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Liu, Lily Y. & Patton, Andrew J. & Sheppard, Kevin, 2015. "Does anything beat 5-minute RV? A comparison of realized measures across multiple asset classes," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 187(1), pages 293-311.
    10. Fricke, Daniel & Lux, Thomas, 2012. "Core-periphery structure in the overnight money market: Evidence from the e-MID trading platform," Kiel Working Papers 1759, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    11. Philippe Jorion & Gaiyan Zhang, 2009. "Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2053-2087, October.
    12. Lee, Charles M C & Ready, Mark J, 1991. " Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 733-746, June.
    13. Stefan Weber & Kay Giesecke, 2003. "Credit Contagion and Aggregate Losses," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 246, Society for Computational Economics.
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