Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?
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Other versions of this item:
- Maia David, 2005. "Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 514-529, November.
References listed on IDEAS
- Farzin, Y H & Kort, P M, 2000.
" Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 183-212.
- Kort, P.M. & Farzin, Y.H., 2000. "Pollution abatement investment when environmental regulation is uncertain," Other publications TiSEM 90e78d8b-95d9-4d17-9d0f-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Barnett, A H, 1980. "The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1037-1041, December.
- Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
- Buchanan, James M, 1969. "External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 174-177, March.
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2014. "Do emission subsidies reduce emission? In the context of environmental R&D organization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 511-516.
More about this item
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
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