Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory
In this paper, we construct a mathematical model that applies tools from evolutionary game theory to issues in organizational ecology. Evolutionary game theory shares the key feature of mathematical rigor with the industrial organization tradition, but is similar to organizational ecology by emphasizing evolutionary dynamics. Evolutionary game theory may well be a complementary modeling tool for the analytical study of organizational ecology issues, next to formal logic, standard game theory, and agent-based simulation. We illustrate this claim in the context of resource-partitioning theory. We assess the impact of an organization population’s resource space shape and scale economies on organizational performance and market evolution. The model demonstrates that the shift of resource distribution from homogeneous (heterogeneous) to heterogeneous (homogeneous) benefits specialism (generalism). On top of that, we offer a new result by revealing the distinct effects of external and internal scale economies on market evolution.
|Date of creation:||May 2009|
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