Negociação Salarial Dos Servidores Públicos Federais: Uma Análise Sob A Ótica De Economia Política Positiva
Negotiation is a word that gains more importance nowadays. Understanding the bargaining process is an issue that people, enterprises, labor unions and governments are caring about. The main point studied here is the issue of how the government takes positions in a bargaining process with its employees. Beginning with the analysis of a revision of game theory, political economics, and the papers about bargaining, this paper studies the wage upgrade of public servants in the central government of Brazil. In the case of the Brazilian government, it looks like the Government has a preference to give some positive upgrade in wages, but this process is done in a way that the Government treats with each kind of servants separately, giving different wage upgrades. The model used was electoral competition in which the wage upgrade was added in the utility function of the public servants as a gain in their income. Three cases were studied: first, there are two groups, one is the group of normal citizens and the other is the public servants. In the second case, the servants were splint into distinct groups and they receive different wage upgrades. In the last case, there are two different groups of servants, but they receive the same wage upgrade. The main conclusion is that the Government has an incentive to negotiate separately with each group of public servants and give different wage upgrades when the Government wants to maximize the probability of win the election.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Prof Marcos Valdemar de Freitas Reis s/n Campus do Gragoatá Bloco F Niterói, RJ 24210-201 Brazil|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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98-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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- Alessro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, . "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives," Penn CARESS Working Papers b96440ba0bfa06ca550ac40aa, Penn Economics Department.
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