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A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback

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  • Dindo, P.D.E.

    (Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa)

  • Tuinstra, J.

Abstract

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between different behavioral rules that specify how to play the game in a repeated setting. This results in an analytically tractable model which is able to describe the type of behavior found in the experimental and computational literature. We find that an increase in the number of players destabilizes the unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The time series of perpetually fluctuating participation rates typically exhibits linear autocorrelation structure and underparticipation. We investigate whether this time series structure can be exploited, and we relate underparticipation to the payoff structure of the participation game.

Suggested Citation

  • Dindo, P.D.E. & Tuinstra, J., 2006. "A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," CeNDEF Working Papers 06-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:06-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Troy Tassier, 2013. "Handbook of Research on Complexity, by J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Edward Elgar," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 39(1), pages 132-133.
    2. Cars H. Hommes, 2009. "Bounded Rationality and Learning in Complex Markets," Chapters, in: J. Barkley Rosser Jr. (ed.), Handbook of Research on Complexity, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. William Brock & Pietro Dindo & Cars Hommes, 2006. "Adaptive rational equilibrium with forward looking agents," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(3‐4), pages 241-278, September.
    4. Antonio Doria, Francisco, 2011. "J.B. Rosser Jr. , Handbook of Research on Complexity, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK--Northampton, MA, USA (2009) 436 + viii pp., index, ISBN 978 1 84542 089 5 (cased)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 196-204, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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