Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game
A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players use a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The analysing power is limited and can adapt when necessary. Interesting cooperation and competition patterns of the society seem to arise and to be responsive to the payoff function.
Volume (Year): 246 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 1997. "Fluctuations around Nash equilibria in game theory," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 245(1), pages 181-188.
- Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-11, May.
- W. Brian Arthur, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning, Bounded Rationality and the Bar Problem," Working Papers 94-03-014, Santa Fe Institute.
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