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Best Management Practices and the Mitigation of Dust Pollution: An Arizona Case Study

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  • Bilby, David B.
  • Wilson, Paul N.

Abstract

This study explores recent rulemaking interactions of agricultural and regulatory parties in developing best management practices for agricultural dust control. Regulatory outcomes are predicted based on each party’s interests and power utilizing a mutual gains negotiation framework. A triangulated research design reveals that the final rules satisfied the economic objectives of agricultural interests, met the rulemaking expediency of the regulators, and likely failed to significantly mitigate dust pollution. The analysis provides rare empirical support for the concern that a collaborative rulemaking process can be captured by regulated interests in the sense that required changes in regulatee operational practices are minimized in the adopted regulations with the, at least temporary, approval of the regulator.

Suggested Citation

  • Bilby, David B. & Wilson, Paul N., 2014. "Best Management Practices and the Mitigation of Dust Pollution: An Arizona Case Study," Working Papers 185894, University of Arizona, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:usazwp:185894
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.185894
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard F. Kazmierczak & David W. Hughes, 1997. "Reasonable Value and the Role of Negotiation in Agriculture's Use of the Environment," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 108-121.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    3. P. Lynn Kennedy & E. Jane Luzar, 1999. "Toward Methodological Inclusivism: The Case for Case Studies," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 21(2), pages 579-591.
    4. Susan Helper, 2000. "Economists and Field Research: "You Can Observe a Lot Just by Watching."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 228-232, May.
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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; Political Economy;
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