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Does engagement improve groundwater management?

Author

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  • Silva, Felipe de Figuereido
  • Fulginiti, Lilyan E.
  • Perrin, Richard K.
  • Burbach, Marck

Abstract

Groundwater use often has external effects on both the environment and future groundwater benefits, leading to over withdrawal. Ostrom’s research on common property resources (CPR) and related literature indicates that CPR management may improve if users have more information about the groundwater system, more opportunities for communication, and empowerment to regulate. In this paper, we conduct a computer laboratory experiment involving 180 students to evaluate the role of these components of engagement in reducing irrigation withdrawals from an aquifer. Our treatments, which consisted of different levels of information, communication and empowerment, resulted in decreases in groundwater extraction and increases in irrigation profits over nine-year extraction horizons. Enhanced information and communication also increased the fraction of subjects who voted for and complied with collective action in the form of quotas on pumping levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Silva, Felipe de Figuereido & Fulginiti, Lilyan E. & Perrin, Richard K. & Burbach, Marck, 2021. "Does engagement improve groundwater management?," Staff Papers 311051, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nbaesp:311051
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.311051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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