IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, Processes and Legal Forms in Industrialised Countries


  • Ogus, Anthony


The aim of this paper is identify and compare the key features of regulatory systems in industrialised countries. By way of essential background, the first section deals with the constitutional and cultural environment which underpins the systems, but it also includes a discussion of regulatory traditions and styles which, for example as between anglophone and continental European regimes are significantly different. Institutional frameworks are discussed in the second section, covering, inter alia, the relationship between regulatory agencies and government, the breadth of remit of regulatory institutions and the degree of discretion conferred on them by legislation. The latter necessarily gives rise to issues concerning the forms of and institutions of accountability. In the third section, we consider regulatory procedures and management. Noteworthy here are, on the one hand, the systems of consultation and the extent to which public hearings are encouraged and, on the other, cost-benefit or regulatory impact analysis to which, in some jurisdictions, are mandatory for regulatory policy- makers. The final section is concerned with legal instruments and here we concentrate on the growing distance between traditional "command and control" methods and those relying on financial incentives and other economic instruments. Appended to the paper are two case studies which attempt to show how these features are deployed by different jurisdictions in two areas of concrete policy- making: taxicabs and water quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Ogus, Anthony, 2002. "Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, Processes and Legal Forms in Industrialised Countries," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30609, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:idpmcr:30609

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Mashaw, Jerry L, 1985. "Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 81-100, Spring.
    2. P S Morrison, 1997. "Restructuring effects of deregulation: the case of the New Zealand taxi industry," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 29(5), pages 913-928, May.
    3. Noam, Eli, 1982. "The Choice of Governmental Level in Regulation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 278-291.
    4. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    5. Gallick, Edward C & Sisk, David E, 1987. "A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 117-128, Spring.
    6. Esty, Daniel C. & Geradin, Damien (ed.), 2001. "Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198299059.
    7. P S Morrison, 1997. "Restructuring Effects of Deregulation: The Case of the New Zealand Taxi Industry," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 29(5), pages 913-928, May.
    8. Macey, Jonathan R, 1992. "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 93-110, March.
    9. Hai Yang & Yan Lau & Sze Wong & Hong Lo, 2000. "A macroscopic taxi model for passenger demand, taxi utilization and level of services," Transportation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 317-340, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Cassey Lee, 2007. "Legal Traditions and Competition Policy," Chapters,in: Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    3. Minogue, Martin, 2005. "Apples and oranges: problems in the analysis of comparative regulatory governance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 195-214, May.

    More about this item


    Public Economics;


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:idpmcr:30609. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.