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Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials

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  • Holden, Stein T.
  • Bezabih, Mintewab

Abstract

This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord's tenure insecurity leads to sub-optimal level of effort on tenant's part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The landlord's enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Holden, Stein T. & Bezabih, Mintewab, 2006. "Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25273, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae06:25273
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela & van Koppen, Barbara & Behrman, Julia & Karelina, Zhenya & Akamandisa, Vincent & Hope, Lesley & Wielgosz, Ben, 2012. "Putting Gender on the Map: Methods for mapping gendered farm management systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," IFPRI discussion papers 1153, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Quisumbing, Agnes R. & Pandolfelli, Lauren, 2010. "Promising Approaches to Address the Needs of Poor Female Farmers: Resources, Constraints, and Interventions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 581-592, April.
    3. Klaus Deininger & Daniel Ayalew Ali & Tekie Alemu, 2008. "Assessing the Functioning of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 67-100, October.
    4. Jin, Songqing & Deininger, Klaus, 2009. "Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation: Productivity and equity impacts from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 629-646, December.
    5. Ma, Xianlei & Heerink, Nico & van Ierlan, Ekko & Lang, Hairu & Shi, Xiaoping, 2015. "Impact of Tenure Security and Trust on Land Rental Market Development in Rural China," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 212219, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. Xianlei Ma & Nico Heerink & Ekko Ierland & Xiaoping Shi, 2016. "Land tenure insecurity and rural-urban migration in rural China," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(2), pages 383-406, June.
    7. Holden, Stein T. & Deininger, Klaus & Ghebru, Hosaena, 2007. "Impact of Land Certification on Land Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 5211, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Tongwei Qiu & Xianlei Ma & Biliang Luo, 2022. "Are private property rights better? evidence from the marketization of land rentals in rural China," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 875-902, May.
    9. Meinzen-Dick, R., 2010. "Engendering agricultural research," IWMI Working Papers H043604, International Water Management Institute.
      • Meinzen-Dick, Ruth & Quisumbing, Agnes & Behrman, Julia & Biermayr-Jenzano, Patricia & Wilde, Vicki & Noordeloos, Marco & Ragasa, Catherine & Beintema, Nienke, 2010. "Engendering agricultural research," IFPRI discussion papers 973, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. Ghebru, H. & Holden, S., 2018. "Land Access, Land Rental Markets and Rural Poverty Dynamics in Northern Ethiopian Highlands: Panel Data evidence using Survival Models," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277440, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Tang, Liang & Ma, Xianlei & Zhou, Yuepeng & Shi, Xiaoping & Ma, Jia, 2019. "Social relations, public interventions and land rent deviation: Evidence from Jiangsu Province in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 406-420.
    12. Qushim, Berdikul & Gillespie, Jeffrey, 2016. "Women Farm Operators in the U.S. Meat Goat Production: Who is More Productive?," 2016 Annual Meeting, February 6-9, 2016, San Antonio, Texas 230004, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    13. Peterman, Amber & Quisumbing, Agnes & Behrman, Julia & Nkonya, Ephraim, 2010. "Understanding gender differences in agricultural productivity in Uganda and Nigeria," IFPRI discussion papers 1003, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    14. Deininger, Klaus, 2010. "Towards sustainable systems of land administration: Recent evidence and challenges for Africa," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 1-22, September.
    15. Campus, Daniela, 2017. "Gender differentials in agricultural productivity: an empirical evidence from Uganda," 2017 Sixth AIEAA Conference, June 15-16, Piacenza, Italy 261259, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).

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    Keywords

    Land Economics/Use;

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