Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials
This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord's tenure insecurity leads to sub-optimal level of effort on tenant's part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The landlord's enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.iaae-agecon.org/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stein Holden & Bekele Shiferaw & John Pender, 2001.
"Market Imperfections and Land Productivity in the Ethiopian Highlands,"
Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 53-70.
- Holden, Stein & Shiferaw, Bekele & Pender, John L., 2001. "Market imperfections and land productivity in the Ethiopian Highlands:," EPTD discussion papers 76, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Dhawan, Rajeev, 2001. "Firm size and productivity differential: theory and evidence from a panel of US firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 269-293, March.
- Bell, Clive & Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to Cropsharing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 578-588, September.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
- Russell Cooper & T.W. Ross, 1984. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 716, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2006. "Incomplete contracts and investment : a study of land tenancy in Pakistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3826, The World Bank.
- Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
- Bellemare, Marc F. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2003. "An Asset-Risk Model Of Reverse Tenancy," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22132, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)