Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials
This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord's tenure insecurity leads to sub-optimal level of effort on tenant's part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The landlord's enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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