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Credit, Tenancy Choice and Agricultural Efficiency: Evidences from the Northern Region of Bangladesh

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  • Bidisha, Sayema Haque
  • Hossain, Amzad
  • Hasan, Mehedi
  • Alam, Rubaiyat

Abstract

Using both household level and plot level data of Northern Bangladesh, this paper analyzes the difference in agricultural productivity across different contractual arrangements among ultra-poor households. Employing fixed effect model on the Pseudo panel data the paper finds evidence of sub-optimal use of inputs and the consequent lower productivity for lands cultivated under share-cropping contract. The inefficiency on part of the sharecroppers is also evidenced by Stochastic Frontier Model. Although the paper finds no direct impact of credit on productivity, results of Logit estimates suggest that availability of credit induces households to opt for fixed rental contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Bidisha, Sayema Haque & Hossain, Amzad & Hasan, Mehedi & Alam, Rubaiyat, 2017. "Credit, Tenancy Choice and Agricultural Efficiency: Evidences from the Northern Region of Bangladesh," 2017 ASAE 9th International Conference, January 11-13, Bangkok, Thailand 284820, Asian Society of Agricultural Economists (ASAE).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:asae17:284820
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.284820
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cao, Yueming & Bai, Yunli & Zhang, Linxiu, 2021. "Plot Size, Adjacency, and Farmland Rental Contract Choice," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 315378, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Khanal, Uttam & Wilson, Clevo & Rahman, Sanzidur & Lee, Boon & Hoang, Vincent, 2020. "Smallholder farmers’ adaptation to climate change and its potential contribution to UN’s sustainable development goals of zero hunger and no poverty," MPRA Paper 106917, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Sep 2020.
    3. Liu, Yansui & Zou, Lilin & Wang, Yongsheng, 2020. "Spatial-temporal characteristics and influencing factors of agricultural eco-efficiency in China in recent 40 years," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    4. Yueming Cao & Yunli Bai & Linxiu Zhang, 2022. "Plot Size, Adjacency, and Farmland Rental Contract Choice," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-21, April.
    5. İbrahim Bozkurt & M. Veysel Kaya, 2021. "Agricultural production index: International comparison," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 67(6), pages 236-245.
    6. Le Phuong Xuan Dang & Viet-Ngu Hoang & Son Hong Nghiem & Clevo Wilson, 2023. "Social capital and informal credit access: empirical evidence from a Vietnamese household panel survey," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 311-340, July.
    7. Nasim, Sanval & Helfand, Steven & Dinar, Ariel, 2020. "Groundwater management under heterogeneous land tenure arrangements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    8. Kassouri, Yacouba & Kacou, Kacou Yves Thierry, 2022. "Does the structure of credit markets affect agricultural development in West African countries?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 588-601.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation

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