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Contracting Over Common Property: Cost-Share Contracts For Predator Control

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  • Yoder, Jonathan K.

Abstract

Predator control cost-share contracts among livestock producers in North America date back to 1630. A model is developed which provides refutable implications for the structure and distribution of these contracts over time and space. Historical and contemporary state and county level data on sheep producer coyote control generally support the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoder, Jonathan K., 1999. "Contracting Over Common Property: Cost-Share Contracts For Predator Control," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21657, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21657
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21657
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1985. "Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 368-385, June.
    2. Anil Rupasingha & Fred O. Boadu, 1998. "Evolutionary Theories and the Community Management of Local Commons: A Survey," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 530-546.
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    6. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    7. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August.
    8. Carlson, Gerald A. & Sappie, Glen & Hammig, Michael, 1989. "Economic Returns to Boll Weevil Eradication," Agricultural Economic Reports 308080, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abby ShalekBriski & B. Wade Brorsen & Jon T. Biermacher, 2021. "Institutional Solutions for the Economic Problem of Feral Hogs," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(3), pages 970-984, September.
    2. Rollins, Kimberly S. & Heigh, Lori & Kanetkar, Vinay, 2004. "Net Costs of Wildlife Damage on Private Lands," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1-20, December.

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