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Analysing Institutional Set-up of Forest Management in Pakistan

  • Lubna Hasan

    (PIDE)

This study analyses the institutional set-up of forest management in Pakistan, focusing on the North West Frontier Province, which houses 40 percent of the total forestlands. These areas have faced significant deforestation in the past. It is feared that if nothing is done to check this process, these forests will soon disappear. The study argues for the Property Rights School of thought that the roots of environmental problems are to be traced to inadequate and illdefined property institutions. The study develops a normative criterion, describing the conditions that are essential for optimal utilisation and conservation of a resource, to be used in assessing the present situation. The analysis indicates that there are problems in the ownership structure, in the enforcement of property rules, as well as in the management system. It is concluded that the present institutional set-up is inappropriate to achieve the objective of forest conservation, and changes in this set-up are suggested. The study puts forward ‘collective management’ as an alternative institutional set-up.

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File URL: http://www.pide.org.pk/Research/Report182.pdf
File Function: First Version, 2001
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in its series PIDE-Working Papers with number 2001:182.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pid:wpaper:2001:182
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  1. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
  2. Soofia Mumtaz & Durr-E-Nayab, 1991. "Management Arrangements of the Chaprote Forest and their Implications for Sustainable Development," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 30(4), pages 1075-1086.
  3. Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
  4. Nabli, Mustapha K. & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 1989. "The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1333-1347, September.
  5. Azhar, Rauf A, 1993. "Commons, Regulation, and Rent-Seeking Behavior: The Dilemma of Pakistan's Guzara Forests," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 115-29, October.
  6. Soofia Mumtaz & Durr-e-Nayab, 1992. "The Rationale of Common Property in the Development Context," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 31(3), pages 259-286.
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