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Gestion communautaire et forêt de Tiogo au Burkina Faso

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  • Martin YELKOUNI

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Abstract

In Burkina Faso, forest is an imperfect public good: non-exclusion in the use of derived goods and services and rivalry in wood exploitation and the non-woody forest product consumption. The free access characterizing it and the free-riding behaviour lead to the forest resources an over-exploitation. This situation is a source of negative externalities, which leads to sub-optimisation allocation of these natural resources. These externalities impose costs on the whole society (social cost) and policy interventions are needed to avoid “tragedy of the commons”. In the related literature, two solutions are traditionally recommended: privatisation or public intervention regulating collective use of the resource. But a community-based management may be an alternative to the observed State mismanagement? This study analyses the required conditions to the implementation of a community-based natural resource management for the Tiogo forest in Burkina Faso.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin YELKOUNI, 2004. "Gestion communautaire et forêt de Tiogo au Burkina Faso," Working Papers 200415, CERDI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:638
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    References listed on IDEAS

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