Comparing Policy Instruments in a Dynamic Environment with Strategic Firms: The Case of Minnesota Phosphorus Emissions
This paper examines the strategic behavior of firms under emissions taxes and tradable emissions permits designed to mitigate phosphorus emissions. The Nash payoff to the regulator of the strategic game is determined for a sub-basin of the Minnesota River using econometric estimates of cost and benefit functions representative of the region. These payoffs are compared to determine the preferred policy instrument. Results show that emission permits yield lower deadweight losses than emissions taxes.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202|
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Richard E. Just & RDavid Zilberman, 1988. "A Methodology for Evaluating Equity Implications of Environmental Policy Decisions in Agriculture," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(1), pages 37-52.
- Westra, John V., 1999. "Agricultural Phosphorus Nonpoint Source Pollution In The Minnesota River," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21490, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Loomis, John B., 1997. "Panel Estimators To Combine Revealed And Stated Preference Dichotomous Choice Data," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(02), December.
- Shortle, James S., 1987. "Allocative Implications Of Comparisons Between The Marginal Costs Of Point And Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement," Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 16(1), April.
- Coggins, Jay S. & Swinton, John R., 1996.
"The Price of Pollution: A Dual Approach to Valuing SO2Allowances,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-72, January.
- JAY S. COGGINS & John R. Swinton, 1994. "The Price of Pollution: A Dual Approach to Valuing SO2 Allowances," Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 378, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
- Moledina, Amyaz A. & Coggins, Jay S. & Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 356-376, March.
- Boyd, James, 2000. "The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's Proposed TMDL Rules," Discussion Papers dp-00-12, Resources For the Future.
- Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997.
"Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
- Kling, Catherine L. & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable Permits for the Control of Environmental Pollution," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1479, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- McKitrick, Ross, 1999. "A Derivation of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 306-314, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20751. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.