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On efficient and fair management of the space debris congestion problem: a preliminary assessment on steady state

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Deschamps

    (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), F-25000 Besançon, France. OFCE-Sciences Po.)

  • Lionel Thomas

    (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), F-25000 Besançon, France.)

Abstract

Contemporary societies differ radically from all earlier ones in that they make daily use of space probes, satellites, and space stations. An unwanted side-effect of this development is the continuing production of space debris. Increasing awareness of and concern over this growing problem means the time has come to ensure the sustainable use of space by removing some of the debris. We investigate how to manage this problem in a steady state through the formation of an international institution tasked with preventing the production of new debris and removing some existing debris effciently and equitably. This preliminary study concludes that this is feasible although it should be emphasized that, under asymmetric information, our model identifies discordance between effciency and fairness, and consequently an ambiguous effect as concerns the occurrence of the Kessler syndrome.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Deschamps & Lionel Thomas, 2025. "On efficient and fair management of the space debris congestion problem: a preliminary assessment on steady state," Working Papers AFED 25-08, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    • Handle: RePEc:afd:wpaper:2508
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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