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Do Judges Contribute to Gender Inequalities Following Divorce? An Empirical Analysis of the Determination of Alimony by French Judges

Author

Listed:
  • Cécile Bourreau-Dubois

    (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) UMR 7522, CNRS, University of Lorraine)

  • Myriam Doriat-Duban

    (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) UMR 7522, CNRS, University of Lorraine)

  • Agnès Gramain

    (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) UMR 7522, CNRS, University of Lorraine)

  • Bruno Jeandidier

    (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) UMR 7522, CNRS, University of Lorraine)

  • Jean-Claude Ray

    (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) UMR 7522, CNRS, University of Lorraine)

Abstract

Drawing upon an exhaustive dataset of French court decisions involving a claim for alimony, this paper presents new findings on the determinants of the level of alimony set by judges in divorce cases. In particular, we show that the amount of alimony can be explained as the result of a twofold logic of compromise. The first is a compromise between the amount of alimony that peers would have set in this specific case and the proposal of the ex-spouses. The second is a compromise between the debtor’s proposal and the creditor’s proposal, with greater weight given to the debtor’s proposal. In this way, our results shed light on the mechanisms by which judges’ decisions have little effect on reducing postdivorce economic gender inequalities, even though the main function of alimony is to reduce the differences in couples’ living standards after divorce. This weak corrective effect can be explained by the overemphasis on the proposal of the debtor and by the fact that judges incorporate the peer norm, which is itself dragged down by the proposals of the debtors.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Agnès Gramain & Bruno Jeandidier & Jean-Claude Ray, 2025. "Do Judges Contribute to Gender Inequalities Following Divorce? An Empirical Analysis of the Determination of Alimony by French Judges," Working Papers AFED 25-01, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    • Handle: RePEc:afd:wpaper:2501
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dorian Kessler, 2020. "Economic Gender Equality and the Decline of Alimony in Switzerland," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 493-518, September.
    2. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-1061.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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