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On firm choice between online and physical markets

Author

Listed:
  • Yijuan Chen
  • Xiangting Hu
  • Sanxi Li

Abstract

Consumers buying goods online often cannot physically inspect the products prior to purchase. Thus an online market may turn what is usually regarded as a search good into an experience good. We investigate how this feature, together with other features of the marketplace, affects a firms choice between online and physical markets. Using a simple yet flexible framework, we show that the choice of a marketplace can be used to disclose or hide product quality. If the production cost is convex with respect to quality, the firm's choice will be characterized by a cutoff quality level, below which the firm will choose the online market, and above which the firm will choose the physical market. However, if the production cost of quality is concave, there are situations where the highest qualities pool with the lowest ones in the online market, leaving the physical market to intermediate qualities.

Suggested Citation

  • Yijuan Chen & Xiangting Hu & Sanxi Li, 2014. "On firm choice between online and physical markets," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2014-619, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2014-619
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp619.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, 2007. "Dividing Online and Offline: A Case Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 981-1004.
    2. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-334, May.
    3. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
    4. P. Milgrom, 2009. "What the Seller Wont Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 3.
    5. Luís Cabral & Ali Hortaçsu, 2010. "The Dynamics Of Seller Reputation: Evidence From Ebay," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 54-78, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weisstein, Fei L. & Song, Lei & Andersen, Peter & Zhu, Ying, 2017. "Examining impacts of negative reviews and purchase goals on consumer purchase decision," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 201-207.
    2. Wang, Qi & Zhang, Chunyu & Ding, Yi & Xydis, George & Wang, Jianhui & Østergaard, Jacob, 2015. "Review of real-time electricity markets for integrating Distributed Energy Resources and Demand Response," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 695-706.
    3. Mittal, Sheetal & Chawla, Deepak & Sondhi, Neena, 2016. "Segmentation of impulse buyers in an emerging market – An exploratory study," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 53-61.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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