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Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Trade-Offs in Making Data Public

In: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling

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  • Augustin Landier
  • David Thesmar

Abstract

Public or partial disclosure of financial data is a key element in the design of a new regulatory environment. We study the costs and benefits of higher public access to financial data and analyze qualitatively how frequency, disclosure lag and granularity of such open data can be chosen to maximize welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of economic frictions. We lay out a simple framework to choose optimal transparency of financial data.
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Suggested Citation

  • Augustin Landier & David Thesmar, 2011. "Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Trade-Offs in Making Data Public," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 31-44, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12508
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Diego Moreno & Tuomas Takalo, 2016. "Optimal Bank Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 203-231, February.
    2. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2012_009 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
    4. Mardi Dungey & Matteo Luciani & David Veredas, 2012. "Ranking Systemically Important Financial Institutions," CAMA Working Papers 2012-47, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2019. "The Rise of NGO Activism," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 183-212, November.
    6. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
    7. Andrievskaya, Irina & Semenova, Maria, 2016. "Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 33-50.
    8. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Choo, Lawrence & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2021. "Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    9. Diego Moreno & Tuomas Takalo, 2016. "Optimal Bank Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 203-231, February.
    10. Usman Bashir & Yugang Yu & Muntazir Hussain & Xiao Wang & Ahmed Ali, 2017. "Do banking system transparency and competition affect nonperforming loans in the Chinese banking sector?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(21), pages 1519-1525, December.
    11. Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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