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Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline

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  • Freixas, Xavier
  • Laux, Christian

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine what has been the role of information provision to the market throughout the crisis. We consider two main sources of information to the market, financial statements and information provided by credit rating agencies. We examine how these sources of information work and the effectiveness of their disclosure process during the crisis. Contrary to the commonly held view, fair value accounting did not have a major impact on the crisis development and severity. However, the structure and lack of accountability of credit rating agencies had a profound impact on their incentives, which may have jeopardized the accuracy of the whole rating process. We claim that the crisis experience has changed the way we think about information as well as market discipline and discuss policy implications and proposals for regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Freixas, Xavier & Laux, Christian, 2011. "Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/11, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201111
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Leuz, Christian & Triantis, Alexander & Yue Wang, Tracy, 2008. "Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 181-208, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2015. "Credit Rating Agency, Preliminary Ratings and Contact Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2015/04, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mark-to-Market; Fair-Value Accounting; Credit Rating Agencies; Financial Crisis; Regulation; Financial Institutions; Banks;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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