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Daniel Janusz Marszalec

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:Janusz
Last Name:Marszalec
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma2105
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://daniel.marszalec.com

Affiliation

Social Science Research Institute
International Christian University

Tokyo, Japan
http://icussri.org/
RePEc:edi:ssicujp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. U. Sumalia & Daniel Skerritt & Anna Schuhbauer & Sebastian Villasante & Andres Cisneros-Montemayor & Hussain Sinan & Duncan Burnside & Patrízia Abdallah & Keita Abe & Juliano Abrantes & Kwasi Addo & , 2021. "WTO must ban harmful fisheries subsidies," Artefactual Field Experiments 00743, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Daniel Skerritt & Anna Schuhbauer & Sebastian Villasante & Andres Cisneros-Montemayor & Hussain Sinan & Duncan Burnside & Patri­zia Abdallah & Keita Abe & Juliano Abrantes & Kw, 2021. "WTO must ban harmful fisheries subsidies," Working Paper Series 1221, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
  2. Sanna Laksa & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Morning-Fresh: Declining Prices and the Right-to-Choose in a Faroese Fish Market," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1141, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  3. Daniel Marszalec & Maria Martin-Rodriguez, 2020. "Piracy as promotion? The Importance of Diffusion in the Music Industry," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1139, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  4. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  5. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  6. Daniel Marszalec, 2017. "Testing the Validity of Non-Parametric Value Estimates in Treasury Bill Auctions Using Top-Up Auction Data," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1074, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  7. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "Revisiting the Anglo-Dutch Auction," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1021, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  8. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "The Impact of Auction Choice on Revenue in Treasury Bill Auctions - An Empirical Evaluation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1020, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  9. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "Auctions For Complements –An Experimental Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1018, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

Articles

  1. Daniel Marszalec, 2024. "Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 215-242, April.
  2. Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023. "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  3. Marszalec, Daniel, 2018. "Fear not the simplicity - An experimental analysis of auctions for complements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 81-97.
  4. Marszalec, Daniel, 2017. "The impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions – An empirical evaluation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 215-239.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. U. Sumalia & Daniel Skerritt & Anna Schuhbauer & Sebastian Villasante & Andres Cisneros-Montemayor & Hussain Sinan & Duncan Burnside & Patrízia Abdallah & Keita Abe & Juliano Abrantes & Kwasi Addo & , 2021. "WTO must ban harmful fisheries subsidies," Artefactual Field Experiments 00743, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Daniel Skerritt & Anna Schuhbauer & Sebastian Villasante & Andres Cisneros-Montemayor & Hussain Sinan & Duncan Burnside & Patri­zia Abdallah & Keita Abe & Juliano Abrantes & Kw, 2021. "WTO must ban harmful fisheries subsidies," Working Paper Series 1221, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.

    Cited by:

    1. Kristen Hopewell, 2022. "Emerging Powers, Leadership, and South–South Solidarity: The Battle Over Special and Differential Treatment at the WTO," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(4), pages 469-482, September.
    2. Nava-Guerrero, Graciela-del-Carmen & Hansen, Helle Hvid & Korevaar, Gijsbert & Lukszo, Zofia, 2022. "An agent-based exploration of the effect of multi-criteria decisions on complex socio-technical heat transitions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 306(PB).

  2. Sanna Laksa & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Morning-Fresh: Declining Prices and the Right-to-Choose in a Faroese Fish Market," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1141, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023. "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers 202310, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.

  3. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  4. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Natural capital market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 35(1), pages 138-161.

  5. Daniel Marszalec, 2017. "Testing the Validity of Non-Parametric Value Estimates in Treasury Bill Auctions Using Top-Up Auction Data," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1074, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

  6. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "The Impact of Auction Choice on Revenue in Treasury Bill Auctions - An Empirical Evaluation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1020, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    2. Penalver, Adrian & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Akiyama, Eizo & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro, 2020. "A quantitative easing experiment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    3. Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023. "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    4. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
    6. Takahiro Hattori & Shogo Takahashi, 2021. "Discriminatory versus uniform auctions:Evidence from JGB market," Discussion papers ron344, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan.
    7. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    8. Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2019. "A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1048r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Nov 2019.
    9. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    10. Shida, Jakob, 2023. "Primary market demand for German government bonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    11. Shiying Chen & Zhenhuan Dong & Chunming Cao & Changjun Zheng, 2022. "Strategy and design of multi‐unit auction in grouped asymmetric setting," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3435-3453, December.
    12. Daniel Marszalec, 2017. "Testing the Validity of Non-Parametric Value Estimates in Treasury Bill Auctions Using Top-Up Auction Data," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1074, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Samuel Häfner, 2023. "Risk aversion in share auctions: Estimating import rents from TRQs in Switzerland," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), pages 419-470, May.
    14. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Inaba, Kei-Ichiro, 2019. "The behaviour of bidders in quantitative-easing auctions of sovereign bonds in Japan: Determinants of the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 206-214.

  7. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "Auctions For Complements –An Experimental Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1018, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    2. Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2018. "The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment," EconStor Preprints 176842, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

Articles

  1. Marszalec, Daniel, 2018. "Fear not the simplicity - An experimental analysis of auctions for complements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 81-97.

    Cited by:

    1. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Benedikt Bünz & Benjamin Lubin & Sven Seuken, 2022. "Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1157-1173, December.

  2. Marszalec, Daniel, 2017. "The impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions – An empirical evaluation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 215-239.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2017-12-18 2019-07-15 2020-02-10 2020-02-10. Author is listed
  2. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 2021-12-06 2023-07-17
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2016-07-16 2019-07-15
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2016-09-04 2019-07-15
  5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2016-07-16
  6. NEP-CUL: Cultural Economics (1) 2020-02-10
  7. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2016-07-16
  8. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2019-07-15
  9. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2020-02-10
  10. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (1) 2020-02-10

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