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Mark Hertzendorf

Personal Details

First Name:Mark
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hertzendorf
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe8

Affiliation

Federal Trade Commission
Government of the United States

Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
http://www.ftc.gov/

: (202) 326-3300

Office of Policy and Evaluation, Room 394, Bureau of Competition, Washington, D.C. 20580
RePEc:edi:ftcgvus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hertzendorf, M.N., 1990. "I'M Not A High Quality Firm But I Play One On T.V.: A Model Of Signaling Product Quality," RCER Working Papers 216, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

Articles

  1. Hertzendorf, Mark N, 1995. "Recursive Utility and the Rate of Impatience," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 51-65, January.
  2. Mark N. Hertzendorf, 1993. "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 236-247, Summer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

    Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

  1. Hertzendorf, Mark N, 1995. "Recursive Utility and the Rate of Impatience," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 51-65, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Paul Chavas, 2004. "On Impatience, Economic Growth and the Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Dynamic Analysis of Resource Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 123-152, June.
    2. Oded Galor & David Mayer-Foulkes, 2004. "Food for Thought: Basic Needs and Persistent Educational Inequality," GE, Growth, Math methods 0410002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Chavas, Jean-Paul, 2013. "On the microeconomics of food and malnutrition under endogenous discounting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 80-96.

  2. Mark N. Hertzendorf, 1993. "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 236-247, Summer.

    Cited by:

    1. KISS Marietta & KUN Andras Istvan, 2014. "Analysis Of The Signaling Hypothesis In Higher Education Marketing Via Classroom Experiment," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 1005-1012, July.
    2. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, "undated". "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges.
    3. de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
    4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Secrecy and Safety," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1074-1091, September.
    5. Dragan Filipovich, 2001. "Price dynamics in a two-period reputation model," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 16(2), pages 185-201.
    6. Utaka, Atsuo, 2008. "Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 878-888, July.
    7. Haiyan Liu, 2016. "A Structural Model of Advertising Signaling and Social Learning: The Case of the Motion Picture Industry," Working Papers 0216, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    8. Jie Bai, 2016. "Melons as Lemons: Asymmetric Information, Consumer Learning and Seller Reputation," Natural Field Experiments 00540, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Advertising as signal jamming," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 91-113.
    10. José Luis Moraga-González, 1997. "Quality Uncertainty and Informative Advertising," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    11. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 39-55.
    12. Aaron Baird & Chadwick J. Miller & T. S. Raghu & Rajiv K. Sinha, 2016. "Product Line Extension in Consumer Software Markets in the Presence of Free Alternatives," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 282-301, June.
    13. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Small Noise in Signaling Selects Pooling on Minimum Signal," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 101, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    14. Ignatius Horstmann & Sridhar Moorthy, 2003. "Advertising Spending and Quality for Services: The Role of Capacity," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 337-365, September.
    15. Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2009. "Misinformative advertising," IESE Research Papers D/809, IESE Business School.
    16. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007. "Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
    17. Taylor Randall & Karl Ulrich & David Reibstein, 1998. "Brand Equity and Vertical Product Line Extent," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 356-379.
    18. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    19. TRUYTS, Tom, 2012. "Stochastic signaling: information substitutes and complements," CORE Discussion Papers 2012022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    20. Moorthy, Sridhar & Hawkins, Scott A., 2005. "Advertising repetition and quality perception," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 354-360, March.
    21. Ian McCarthy, 2008. "Simulating Sequential Search Models with Genetic Algorithms: Analysis of Price Ceilings, Taxes, Advertising and Welfare," Caepr Working Papers 2008-010, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
    22. Moraga González, José Luis, 1997. "Quality uncetainty and informative advertising," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6040, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    23. Amin Sayedi & Jeffrey D. Shulman, 2017. "Strategic compliments in sales," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 57-84, March.
    24. Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2002. "Product compatibility as a signal of quality in a market with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 949-964, September.
    25. Zhao, Ming & Dong, Ciwei & Cheng, T.C.E., 2018. "Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises in a competitive marketplace," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(1), pages 218-229.
    26. Ernst, Holger & Wickede, Anje, 1999. "Einflußfaktoren auf die Glaubwürdigkeit kundenorientierter Produkt-Vorankündigungen: Ein signaltheoretischer Ansatz," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 515, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    27. Silvia Martínez-Gorricho, 2012. "Beneficial consumer fraud," Working Papers. Serie AD 2012-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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