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CEO Social Status and Risk-Taking

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  • Joshua Shemesh

    (Department of Finance, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne, Australia)

Abstract

I examine whether changes in CEO status affect risk-related business decisions. I use prestigious awards as shocks to CEO status relative to other CEOs. Firms with award-winning CEOs decrease their idiosyncratic volatility, and their industry betas converge towards one. These firms also reduce their spending on research and development, while increasing investment in fixed assets relative to a matched sample of firms with non-winning CEOs. The evidence suggests that CEOs who reach higher status become more concerned about poor relative performance. By conforming to other firms in their industry, CEOs with the highest reputation can lock-in their relative advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Shemesh, 2017. "CEO Social Status and Risk-Taking," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 1-35, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:qjfxxx:v:07:y:2017:i:02:n:s2010139217500045
    DOI: 10.1142/S2010139217500045
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    Cited by:

    1. Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry & Shapiro, Alex & Subrahmanyam, Marti, 2020. "Security design with status concerns," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    2. Zhou, Linzi & Long, Wenbin & Qu, Xin & Yao, Daifei, 2023. "Celebrity CEOs and corporate investment: A psychological contract perspective," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    3. François Belot & Timothee Waxin, 2024. "Government awards to CEOs," Post-Print hal-04659614, HAL.
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    5. Plaksina, Yulia & Gallagher, Liam & Dowling, Michael, 2019. "CEO social status and M&A decision making," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 282-300.

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