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Optimal Policies In Two-Step Binary Games Under Social Pressure And Limited Resources



    (Department of Economics, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venice, Italy)


    (#x2020;Department of Mathematics, Università di Padova, Via Trieste, 63 35121 Padova, Italy)


    (#x2021;Department of Management, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venice, Italy)


In this paper, we propose a model where binary games with many players are implemented at two subsequent dates. An external authority sets incentives to maximize the gain deriving from the project. We show that the interplay between the optimal participation shares at the two subsequent dates makes the optimal strategy nontrivial and, to some extent, unexpected. As an application, in the context of an insurgence muting into an armed rebellion, we study the emergence of escalation effects when many actors interact taking into account social recognition.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Pellizzari & Elena Sartori & Marco Tolotti, 2015. "Optimal Policies In Two-Step Binary Games Under Social Pressure And Limited Resources," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(05n06), pages 1-16, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:18:y:2015:i:05n06:n:s0219525915500204
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525915500204

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    References listed on IDEAS

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