Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting
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- Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2010. "Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting," Working Papers 204, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Imre Kondor & István Csabai & Gábor Papp & Enys Mones & Gábor Czimbalmos & Máté Sándor, 2014.
"Strong random correlations in networks of heterogeneous agents,"
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- Paolo Pellizzari & Elena Sartori & Marco Tolotti, 2015. "Optimal Policies In Two-Step Binary Games Under Social Pressure And Limited Resources," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(05n06), pages 1-16, August.
More about this item
KeywordsIdentity; Random utility models; Reputation; Social interaction; Voting systems; D72; D81; C62;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
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