Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
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References listed on IDEAS
- Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2000.
"Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections,"
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- Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections," Discussion Papers 1206, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dekel, E. & Piccione, M., 1999. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Papers 3-99, Tel Aviv.
- Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
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- Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2012.
"Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting,"
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination,
Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 7(1), pages 79-98, May.
- Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2010. "Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting," Working Papers 204, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
- Bannikova, Marina & Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel), 2015. "Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order," Working Papers 2072/260957, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsPayoff externality; Coordinated votes; Sequential election; Simultaneous election; Information; D72; D82;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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