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Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Sugato Dasgupta
  • Kirk Randazzo
  • Reginald Sheehan
  • Kenneth Williams

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9167-z
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    Article provided by Springer & Economic Science Association in its journal Experimental Economics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 315-335

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:4:p:315-335
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9167-z
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    Keywords: Payoff externality; Coordinated votes; Sequential election; Simultaneous election; Information; D72; D82;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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    1. Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2000. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 34-55, February.
    2. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2012. "Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 7(1), pages 79-98, May.
    2. Bannikova, Marina & Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel), 2015. "Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order," Working Papers 2072/260957, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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