Optimal decisions and coordination mechanism in a green supply chain with loss‐averse consumers in environmental quality

We consider consumers' loss aversion in environmental quality and develop a two‐period game theoretical model to investigate the optimal pricing and environmental quality decisions for a green supply chain where a manufacturer sells products to consumers through a retailer. We then introduce a two‐part tariff contract to coordinate the supply chain for both periods. We suggest that optimal decisions in the second period depend on the reference point of the first period in the decentralized supply chain. A higher reference point leads to the increased environmental quality of products, prices, and profits of supply chain members in the second period. However, when the reference point is sufficiently high, the environmental quality will be lower to avoid excessive environmental investment costs. Furthermore, consumers' loss aversion reduces the environmental quality of products when the reference point is low. As consumers' loss aversion increases, the manufacturer's profit rises, while the wholesale and retail prices and the retailer's profit show a decreasing and then increasing trend. Finally, we find that a two‐part tariff contract enables the two‐period supply chain to be coordinated and achieve Pareto improvements in profit and environmental quality. This study sheds valuable light on understanding consumer environmental preferences and irrational behavior for supply chain decision‐making and green product design.