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Beyond Truth‐Telling: A Replication Study on School Choice

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Listed:
  • Tommy Andersson
  • Dany Kessel
  • Nils Lager
  • Elisabet Olme
  • Simon Reese

Abstract

In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non‐truth‐telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth‐telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 45 of the 57 investigated data sets (p value threshold 0.05).

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson & Dany Kessel & Nils Lager & Elisabet Olme & Simon Reese, 2026. "Beyond Truth‐Telling: A Replication Study on School Choice," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 323-329, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:japmet:v:41:y:2026:i:3:p:323-329
    DOI: 10.1002/jae.70038
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions

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