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From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England

Author

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  • Camille Terrier
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Kevin Ren

Abstract

Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems for student placement. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. We investigate the effects of the national ban of IA in England. Before the ban, 49 local authorities used DA and 16 used IA; all switched to DA afterward. We find that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students.This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Terrier & Parag A. Pathak & Kevin Ren, 2026. "From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 44-87, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:18:y:2026:i:1:p:44-87
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20230056
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Ovidi, 2022. "Parents Know Better: Sorting on Match Effects in Primary School," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def121, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    2. Zuchanek, Kevin J., 2025. "Bridging language gaps: Native language school assignment information under immediate acceptance," Ruhr Economic Papers 1172, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Akbarpour, Mohammad & Kapor, Adam & Neilson, Christopher & van Dijk, Winnie & Zimmerman, Seth, 2022. "Centralized School choice with unequal outside options," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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