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Preferences, Access, and the STEM Gender Gap in Centralized High School Assignment

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  • Diana Ngo
  • Andrew Dustan

Abstract

The gender gap in STEM widens during high school due both to differences in student choices and institutional barriers to accessing STEM education. Using rich data from Mexico City's centralized assignment system and a structural model of high school choice, we document strong demand for elite STEM programs and relatively weak demand for non-elite STEM programs. Decomposition and counterfactual simulations demonstrate that most of the gap is due to gendered choices, with males more strongly preferring STEM. Test-based assignment restricts elite STEM access for females, who have lower placement test scores despite similar low-stakes exam scores.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana Ngo & Andrew Dustan, 2024. "Preferences, Access, and the STEM Gender Gap in Centralized High School Assignment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 257-287, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:4:p:257-87
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20220450
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pathak, Parag A. & Shi, Peng, 2021. "How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 161-195.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ersoy, Fulya & Speer, Jamin D., 2025. "Opening the black box of college major choice: Evidence from an information intervention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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