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Beyond Truth-telling: A Replication Study on School Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Andersson, Tommy

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Kessel, Dany

    (Department of Economics, Södertörn University)

  • Lager, Nils

    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Olme, Elisabet

    (Svensk Utbildningsteknologi AB, Stockholm)

  • Reese, Simon

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 52 of the 58 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, Tommy & Kessel, Dany & Lager, Nils & Olme, Elisabet & Reese, Simon, 2024. "Beyond Truth-telling: A Replication Study on School Choice," Working Papers 2024:1, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2024_001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    school choice; deferred acceptance algorithm; truth-telling; stability; replication study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions

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