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Work Incentives Of Medicaid Beneficiaries And The Role Of Asset Testing

Author

Listed:
  • Svetlana Pashchenko
  • Ponpoje Porapakkarm

Abstract

Should asset testing be used in means†tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome when asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and nonworkers.

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2017. "Work Incentives Of Medicaid Beneficiaries And The Role Of Asset Testing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1117-1154, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:58:y:2017:i:4:p:1117-1154
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12247
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. #HEJC papers for October 2013
      by academichealtheconomists in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2013-10-01 04:30:26

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mariacristina De Nardi & Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2025. "The Lifetime Costs of Bad Health," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(3), pages 1987-2026.
    2. Pashchenko, Svetlana & Porapakkarm, Ponpoje, 2020. "Saving Motives over the Life-Cycle," MPRA Paper 100208, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Zhao, Kai, 2017. "Social insurance, private health insurance and individual welfare," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 102-117.
    4. Kemptner, Daniel, 2019. "Health-related life cycle risks and public insurance," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 65, pages 227-245.
    5. Cooley, Thomas F. & Henriksen, Espen & Nusbaum, Charlie, 2024. "Demographic obstacles to European growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    6. Youngsoo Jang & Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2025. "Redistribution, distortions, and the welfare effects of Social Security," Working papers 2025rwp-271, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    7. Blundell, R. & French, E. & Tetlow, G., 2016. "Retirement Incentives and Labor Supply," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 457-566, Elsevier.
    8. Soojin Kim & Serena Rhee, 2022. "Understanding the Aggregate Effects of Disability Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 328-364, October.
    9. Chaoran Chen & Zhigang Feng & Jiaying Gu, 2025. "Health, Health Insurance, And Inequality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(1), pages 107-141, February.
    10. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2019. "Reducing Medical Spending of the Publicly Insured: The Case for a Cash-out Option," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 390-426, August.
    11. Bhashkar Mazumder & Sarah Miller, 2014. "The Effects of the Massachusetts Health Reform on Financial Distress," Working Paper Series WP-2014-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    12. Eric French & John Bailey Jones, 2017. "Health, Health Insurance, and Retirement: A Survey," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 9(1), pages 383-409, September.
    13. Capatina, Elena, 2020. "Selection in employer sponsored health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    14. Alvaro Janez, 2025. "Means-Tested Programs and Interstate Migration in the United States," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 55, January.
    15. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2024. "Accounting For Social Security Claiming Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 505-545, February.
    16. Luduvice, André Victor Doherty, 2024. "The macroeconomic effects of universal basic income programs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    17. Felix Wellschmied, 2021. "The welfare effects of asset mean‐testing income support," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), pages 217-249, January.
    18. Capatina, Elena, 2015. "Life-cycle effects of health risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 67-88.
    19. Youngsoo Jang & Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2026. "Redistribution, Distortions, and the Welfare Effects of Social Security," Working Papers 2025-012, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    20. Jung, Juergen & Tran, Chung, 2022. "Social health insurance: A quantitative exploration," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    21. Jung, Juergen & Shrestha, Vinish, 2025. "Medicaid work requirements, labor market effects and welfare," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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