Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service
Dental service providers in the British National Health Service (NHS) operate under a number of remuneration arrangements that give rise to different incentives. Using data derived from the Scottish dental system, we examine the relationships between remuneration, patient exemption status and treatment intensity. After controlling for differences in patient need and dentist-specific preferences, we find that self-employed dentists treat patients who are exempt from payment more intensively than their salaried counterparts. The results imply that changes in remuneration can have a large effect on the distribution of treatments. More generally, our results provide support for economic models that view financial incentives as important determinants of physician behaviour. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 15 (2006)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1994.
"Hospital Response to Prospective Payment: Moral Hazard, Selection, and Practice-Style Effects,"
0050, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1996. "Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 257-277, June.
- Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2004. "Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 915-931, August.
- John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1994.
"High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00353892, HAL.
- Abowd, J.M. & Kramarz, F. & Margolis, D.N., 1995. "High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms," Cahiers de recherche 9503, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Abowd, J.M. & Kramarz, F. & Margolis, D.N., 1995. "High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms," Cahiers de recherche 9503, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1994. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," NBER Working Papers 4917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Margolis, 1995. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Post-Print halshs-00378229, HAL.
- Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1998.
"Government purchasing of health services,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
9821, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Halvorsen, Robert & Palmquist, Raymond, 1980. "The Interpretation of Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 474-475, June.
- Nigel Rice & Andrew Jones, 1997. "Multilevel models and health economics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(6), pages 561-575.
- Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
- James J. Heckman & Justin L. Tobias & Edward Vytlacil, 2000. "Simple Estimators for Treatment Parameters in a Latent Variable Framework with an Application to Estimating the Returns to Schooling," NBER Working Papers 7950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1996.
"Performance Pay and Productivity,"
NBER Working Papers
5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2002.
"Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 219-249, May.
- Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 2001. "Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings," Economics Series Working Papers 9969, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:15:y:2006:i:9:p:933-946. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.