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Privatizing Disability Insurance

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  • Arthur Seibold
  • Sebastian Seitz
  • Sebastian Siegloch

Abstract

Public disability insurance (DI) programs in many countries face growing fiscal pressures, prompting efforts to reduce spending. In this paper, we investigate the welfare effects of expanding the role of private insurance markets in the face of public DI cuts. We exploit a reform that abolished one part of German public DI and use unique data from a large insurer. We document modest crowding‐out effects of the reform, such that private DI take‐up remains incomplete. We find no adverse selection in the private DI market. Instead, private DI tends to attract individuals with high income, high education, and low disability risk. Using a revealed preference approach, we estimate individual insurance valuations. Our welfare analysis finds that partial DI provision via the voluntary private market can improve welfare. However, distributional concerns may justify a full public DI mandate.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Seibold & Sebastian Seitz & Sebastian Siegloch, 2025. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(5), pages 1697-1737, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:93:y:2025:i:5:p:1697-1737
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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