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Understanding the Increase in Disability Insurance Benefit Receipt in the United States

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  • Jeffrey B. Liebman

Abstract

The share of working-age Americans receiving disability benefits from the federal Disability Insurance (DI) program has increased significantly in recent decades, from 2.2 percent in the late 1970s to 3.6 percent in the years immediately preceding the 2007-2009 recession and 4.6 percent in 2013. With the federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund currently projected to be depleted in 2016, Congressional action of some sort is likely to occur within the next several years. It is therefore a good time to sort out the competing explanations for the increase in disability benefit receipt and to review some of the ideas that economists have put forth for reforming US disability programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2015. "Understanding the Increase in Disability Insurance Benefit Receipt in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(2), pages 123-150, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:29:y:2015:i:2:p:123-50
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.29.2.123
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Congressional Budget Office, 2012. "Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," Reports 43421, Congressional Budget Office.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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