Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: AG HE LS PE
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- David Autor & Mark Duggan & Jonathan Gruber, 2014. "Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 110-141, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Hahn, Jinyong, 2001. "Comment: Binary Regressors in Nonlinear Panel-Data Models with Fixed Effects," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 16-17, January.
- Bruce Meyer & Wallace K. C. Mok, 2016.
"Disability, Earnings, Income and Consumption,"
NBER Chapters, in: Social Insurance Programs (Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar, TAPES),
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce D. Meyer & Wallace K. C. Mok, 2006. "Disability, Earnings, Income and Consumption," Working Papers 0610, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Bruce D. Meyer & Wallace K.C. Mok, 2013. "Disability, Earnings, Income and Consumption," NBER Working Papers 18869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bound, John, 1989.
"The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 482-503, June.
- John Bound, 1989. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants," NBER Working Papers 2816, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2003. "The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 157-206.
- Angrist, Joshua D, 2001.
"Estimations of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice,"
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 2-16, January.
- Joshua Angrist, 1999. "Estimation of Limited-Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice," Working papers 99-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Joshua D. Angrist, 2000. "Estimation of Limited-Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice," NBER Technical Working Papers 0248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eric French & Jae Song, 2014.
"The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 291-337, May.
- Eric French & Jae Song, 2009. "The effect of disability insurance receipt on labor supply," Working Paper Series WP-09-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Raj Chetty, 2008.
"Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
- Chetty, Raj, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Scholarly Articles 9751256, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- David Card & David S. Lee & Zhuan Pei, 2009. "Quasi-Experimental Identification and Estimation in the Regression Kink Design," Working Papers 1206, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2013.
"Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1797-1829, August.
- Nicole Maestas & Kathleen Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2012. "Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt," Working Papers wp241, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
- Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark Cullen, 2012.
"Moral hazard in health insurance: How important is forward looking behavior?,"
Discussion Papers
11-007, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2012. "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: How Important Is Forward Looking Behavior?," NBER Working Papers 17802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Helen Levy, 2004. "Employer-Sponsored Disability Insurance: Where are the Gaps in Coverage?," NBER Working Papers 10382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1419-1426, December.
- Jonathan Gruber, 2000.
"Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
- Jonathan Gruber, 1996. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 5866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2006.
"The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 71-96, Summer.
- David Autor & Mark Duggan, 2006. "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding," NBER Working Papers 12436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raj Chetty, 2008.
"Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
- Raj Chetty, 2008. "Erratum: Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1197-1197, December.
- Till von Wachter & Jae Song & Joyce Manchester, 2011. "Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3308-3329, December.
- Marika Cabral, 2017. "Claim Timing and Ex Post Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 1-44.
- Angrist, Joshua D, 2001. "Estimations of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice: Reply," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 27-28, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2020. "Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade‐Offs and Empirical Evidence," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 129-164, March.
- Fevang, Elisabeth & Hardoy, Inés & Røed, Knut, 2013. "Getting Disabled Workers Back to Work: How Important Are Economic Incentives?," IZA Discussion Papers 7137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
- David Autor & Andreas Kostøl & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2019.
"Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(7), pages 2613-2654, July.
- David Autor & Andreas Ravndal Kostøl & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2017. "Disability benefits, consumption insurance, and household labor supply," Working Paper 2017/16, Norges Bank.
- David Autor & Andreas Ravndal Kostol & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2017. "Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 23466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bíró, Anikó & Elek, Péter, 2020.
"Job loss, disability insurance and health expenditure,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Aniko Biro & Peter Elek, 2019. "Job loss, disability insurance and health expenditures," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1908, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Hassink, Wolter & Koning, Pierre & Zwinkels, Wim, 2015.
"Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
9181, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Wolter H.J. Hassink & Pierre Koning & Wim Zwinkels, 2015. "Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-081/V, Tinbergen Institute.
- Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2016.
"Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations [Absicherung von Personen mit Erwerbsminderung: Erfahrungen aus vier Industrieländern],"
Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 49(4), pages 367-386, December.
- Burkhauser, Richard V. & Daly, Mary C. & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2015. "Protecting Working-Age People with Disabilities: Experiences of Four Industrialized Nations," IZA Discussion Papers 9186, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly & Nicolas Ziebarth, 2015. "Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations," Working Paper Series 2015-8, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- David Stapleton & Robert Burns & Benjamin Doornink & Mary Harris & Robert Anfield & Winthrop Cashdollar & Brian Gifford & Kevin Ufier, 2015. "Targeting Early Intervention to Workers Who Need Help to Stay in the Labor Force," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 496474bae5054b11bfe429d48, Mathematica Policy Research.
- Pian Shu, 2013. "Asset Accumulation and Labor Force Participation of Disability Insurance Applicants," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-008, Harvard Business School.
- Eliason, Marcus & Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Martin, 2018. "Forward-looking moral hazard in social insurance: evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series 2018:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- David C. Stapleton & Yonatan Ben-Shalom & David R. Mann, "undated". "The Employment/Eligibility Service System: A New Gateway for Employment Supports and Social Security Disability Benefits," Mathematica Policy Research Reports d8835946ad2743028b4b7acfc, Mathematica Policy Research.
- Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018.
"Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
- Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Pradhan, Shailee, 2016. "Can Group Incentives Alleviate Moral Hazard? The Role of Pro-Social Preferences," Working Papers on Finance 1610, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Nov 2016.
- Matthew J. Hill & Jose I. Silva & Judit Vall Castello, 2019.
"Act now: The effects of the 2008 Spanish disability reform,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(7), pages 906-920, July.
- Matthew J. Hill & Jose Silva & Judit Vall, 2015. "Act Now: The Effects of the 2008 Spanish Disability Reform," Studies in Economics 1512, School of Economics, University of Kent.
- Eliason, Marcus & Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Martin, 2019. "Forward-looking moral hazard in social insurance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 84-98.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGE-2012-07-01 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-CTA-2012-07-01 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HEA-2012-07-01 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2012-07-01 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2012-07-01 (Labour Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.