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A Monetary Analysis of Balance Sheet Policies

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  • Markus Hörmann
  • Andreas Schabert

Abstract

We augment a standard macroeconomic model to analyze the effects and limitations of balance sheet policies. We show that the central bank can stimulate real activity by changing the size or the composition of its balance sheet, when interest rate policy is ineffective. Specifically, the central bank can stabilize the economy by increasing money supply against eligible assets even when the policy rate is at the zero lower bound. By changing the composition of its balance sheet, it can affect interest rates and, for example, neutralize increases in firms' borrowing costs, which is not possible under a single instrument regime. We further analyze the limitations of balance sheet policies and show that they are particularly useful under liquidity demand shocks.
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Suggested Citation

  • Markus Hörmann & Andreas Schabert, 2015. "A Monetary Analysis of Balance Sheet Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 1888-1917, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:125:y:2015:i:589:p:1888-1917
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2015.125.issue-589
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. van der Kwaak, Christiaan, 2017. "Financial Fragility and Unconventional Central Bank Lending Operations," Research Report 17005-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    2. Schabert, Andreas, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy, asset purchases, and credit market frictions," Working Paper Series 1738, European Central Bank.
    3. Salachas, Evangelos N. & Laopodis, Nikiforos T. & Kouretas, Georgios P., 2017. "The bank-lending channel and monetary policy during pre- and post-2007 crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 176-187.
    4. Linnemann, Ludger & Schabert, Andreas, 2015. "Liquidity premia and interest rate parity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 178-192.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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