IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/complx/v2022y2022i1n3885934.html

Evolutionary Game of Social Network for Emergency Mobilization (SNEM) of Magnitude Emergencies: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Rui Nan
  • Jingjie Wang
  • Wenjun Zhu

Abstract

As a common social network, the SNEM plays an important role in emergency management. Magnitude emergencies are characterized by high complexity and uncertainty, and it is impossible to rely on the government for emergency management alone. We should absorb multiple subjects to build the SNEM and carry out extensive emergency mobilization in the whole society. The SNEM can integrate resources, gather consensus, promote participation, and reduce risks. The analysis of the types, generation mechanism, subject behavior, and strategy selection of the SNEM aid in adopting appropriate mobilization strategy based on magnitude emergencies, achieving the adaptation of the SNEM and emergency scenarios. By constructing the evolutionary game model of the SNEM for magnitude emergencies, taking China as an empirical sample, this paper explores the behavior evolution law and stable strategy of the government, social organizations, and the public. The results showed that the symbiotic SNEM with a positive response of social organizations and the public under the path of high‐intensity mobilization by the government is the best strategy combination, and it is conducive to maximizing the emergency joint force.

Suggested Citation

  • Rui Nan & Jingjie Wang & Wenjun Zhu, 2022. "Evolutionary Game of Social Network for Emergency Mobilization (SNEM) of Magnitude Emergencies: Evidence from China," Complexity, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2022(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:complx:v:2022:y:2022:i:1:n:3885934
    DOI: 10.1155/2022/3885934
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/3885934
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2022/3885934?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Sabina Schnell & John Saxby, 2010. "Mobilizing against hunger and poverty: Capacity and change in a Brazilian social mobilization network," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(1), pages 38-48, February.
    2. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    3. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Adam Douglas Henry & Mark Lubell, 2013. "Political Homophily and Collaboration in Regional Planning Networks," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(3), pages 598-610, July.
    4. Rosenberg, Alana & Hartwig, Kari & Merson, Michael, 2008. "Government-NGO collaboration and sustainability of orphans and vulnerable children projects in southern Africa," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-60, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arthur Schram & Boris Van Leeuwen & Theo Offerman, 2013. "Superstars Need Social Benefits: An Experiment on Network Formation," Working Papers 1306, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jul 2013.
    2. Eunae Yoo & Elliot Rabinovich & Bin Gu, 2020. "The Growth of Follower Networks on Social Media Platforms for Humanitarian Operations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(12), pages 2696-2715, December.
    3. Finneran, Lisa & Kelly, Morgan, 2003. "Social networks and inequality," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 282-299, March.
    4. Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2011. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Research Papers in Economics 2011:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    5. Diemer, Andreas & Regan, Tanner, 2022. "No inventor is an island: Social connectedness and the geography of knowledge flows in the US," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(2).
    6. Sofia Priazhkina & Samuel Palmer & Pablo Martín-Ramiro & Román Orús & Samuel Mugel & Vladimir Skavysh, 2024. "Digital Payments in Firm Networks: Theory of Adoption and Quantum Algorithm," Staff Working Papers 24-17, Bank of Canada.
    7. Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2011. "Influence functions, followers and command games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 123-138, May.
    8. Baumann, Leonie, 2021. "A model of weighted network formation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), January.
    9. Ugo Bolletta & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2022. "Marriage Through Friends," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1046-1066, December.
    10. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity," Working Papers 1108, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon.
    11. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03005107 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2008. "Myopically Forward-Looking Agents in a Network Formation Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    13. Bravard, Christophe & Charroin, Liza & Touati, Corinne, 2017. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 62-79.
    14. Javier Rivas, 2009. "Friendship selection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 521-538, November.
    15. Beal, Sylvain & Querou, Nicolas, 2007. "Bounded rationality and repeated network formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 71-89, July.
    16. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    17. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023. "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 117-155, March.
    18. Gaonkar, Shweta & Mele, Angelo, 2023. "A model of inter-organizational network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 82-104.
    19. Tolga U. Kuzubas, 2010. "Endogenous Social Networks in the Labor Market," Working Papers 2010/13, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    20. Ana Babus, 2016. "The formation of financial networks," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(2), pages 239-272, May.
    21. Haller, Hans & Hoyer, Britta, 2019. "The common enemy effect under strategic network formation and disruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 146-163.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:complx:v:2022:y:2022:i:1:n:3885934. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/8503 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.