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Getting Doctors to Do Their Best: The Roles of Ability and Motivation in Health Care Quality

  • Kenneth L. Leonard
  • Melkiory C. Masatu
  • Alexandre Vialou

Adherence to medical protocol (quality) is low in most developing countries. We show that, although the differences in knowledge of protocol among doctors in Arusha region of Tanzania are explained by years of training, the differences in actual adherence to protocol and the gap between knowledge and actual adherence are best understood by examining the types of organizations in which these doctors work. These results suggest that some organizations are better at getting doctors to perform at capacity and that understanding the link between organizational structure and protocol adherence is important in any attempt to increase the quality of care.

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File URL: http://jhr.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/XLII/3/682
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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

Volume (Year): 42 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:42:y:2007:i3:p682-700
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/

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  1. Das, Jishnu & Hammer, Jeffrey, 2005. "Money for nothing : the dire straits of medical practice in Delhi, India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3669, The World Bank.
  2. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2004. "Working for God?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4214, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Leonard, Kenneth L., 2002. "When both states and markets fail: asymmetric information and the role of NGOs in African health care," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 61-80, July.
  4. Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Pitt, Mark M., 1984. "Agricultural Prices, Food Consumption and the Health and Productivity of Farmers," Bulletins 7471, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
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  6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
  7. Leonard, Kenneth & Masatu, Melkiory C., 2006. "Outpatient process quality evaluation and the Hawthorne Effect," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 63(9), pages 2330-2340, November.
  8. Das, Jishnu & Hammer, Jeffrey, 2004. "Which doctor? Combining vignettes and item response to measure doctor quality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3301, The World Bank.
  9. Schultz, T-P, 1996. "Wage and Labor Supply effects of Illness in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana : Instrumental Variable Estimates for Days Disabled," Papers 757, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  10. Bhargava, Alok & Jamison, Dean T. & Lau, Lawrence J. & Murray, Christopher J. L., 2001. "Modeling the effects of health on economic growth," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 423-440, May.
  11. Tomas Philipson, 1996. "Private Vaccination and Public Health: An Empirical Examination for U.S. Measles," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(3), pages 611-630.
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