IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v44y2001i2p511-24.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Blass, Asher A
  • Carlton, Dennis W

Abstract

This paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee-dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency, not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws that prohibit company ownership of gasoline stations and find that the annual cost of national divorcement legislation could easily exceed $1 billion. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Blass, Asher A & Carlton, Dennis W, 2001. "The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 511-524, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:511-24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/322815
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    2. Barron, John M & Umbeck, John R, 1984. "The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 313-328, October.
    3. Vita, Michael G, 2000. "Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 217-233, November.
    4. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
    5. Marvel, Howard P., 1995. "Tying, franchising, and gasoline service stations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 199-225, October.
    6. Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-486, May.
    7. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework," CPB Document 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    2. Loertscher, Simon & Reisinger, Markus, 2009. "Competitive E?ects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 278, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 2017. "Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 306-325.
    4. Emek Basker & Lucia Foster & Shawn Klimek, 2015. "Customer-Labor Substitution: Evidence from Gasoline Stations," Working Papers 15-45, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    5. Alicia García-Herrera & Rafael Llorca-Vivero, 2010. "How time influences franchise contracts: the Spanish case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 1-16, August.
    6. Nowakowski Marcin & Karasiewicz Grzegorz, 2016. "Market Structure and Price-Cost Margins in European Retail Gasoline Industry," Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, De Gruyter Open, vol. 24(3), pages 105-124, September.
    7. Erich J. Muehlegger, 2004. "Gasoline Price Spikes and Regional Gasoline Content Regulations - A Structural Approach," Working Papers 0421, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    8. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    9. William Comanor & Jon Riddle, 2003. "The Costs of Regulation: Branded Open Supply and Uniform Pricing of Gasoline," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 135-155.
    10. John M. Barron & Beck A. Taylor & John R. Umbeck, 2004. "Will Open Supply Lower Retail Gasoline Prices?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(1), pages 63-77, January.
    11. Kosová, Renáta & Lafontaine, Francine, 2012. "Much ado about chains: A research agenda," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 303-308.
    12. Emek Basker & Lucia Foster & Shawn Klimek, 2017. "Customer-employee substitution: Evidence from gasoline stations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 876-896, December.
    13. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2013. "Economics of Corporate Form: Why Do Russian Firms Prefer to Be Closed Companies?," RRC Working Paper Series 3, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. Fernando Coloma & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009. "Escalamiento de cargos de acceso e incentivos a la predación de un operador de telefonía local integrado verticalmente," Documentos de Trabajo 361, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:511-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.