The Distortionary Effects of the Health Insurance Tax Exclusion
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- David Powell, 2019. "The Distortionary Effects of the Health Insurance Tax Exclusion," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 428-464, Fall.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021.
"Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
- David Powell & Dana Goldman, 2016. "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 21858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
tax elasticity; generous health-care coverage; cost-sharing; tax subsidy; cadillac tax; deadweight loss;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
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