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Media Plurality and the Intensity of Readers' Political Preferences

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  • Armando J. Garcia Pires

Abstract

In this article, the author studied the effect of the intensity of readers' political preferences on the news firms' incentives to choose between a single- and a multi-ideology strategy (i.e., media uniformity vs. media plurality). The author shows that alternative formalizations of the intensity of readers' preferences alter the equilibrium level of media plurality, given that they affect demand for news. In particular, when the readers' disutility of consuming news that differs from their ideal variety is relatively high for politically close news, the media firms choose a multi-ideology strategy, because the increase in demand is large. On the contrary, when the readers' disutility of consuming news that differs from their ideal variety is relatively low for politically close news, media firms choose a single-ideology strategy because a multi-ideology strategy does not significantly increase demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2013. "Media Plurality and the Intensity of Readers' Political Preferences," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 41-55, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:26:y:2013:i:1:p:41-55
    DOI: 10.1080/08997764.2012.755984
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Garcia Pires, Armando J., 2014. "Media diversity, advertising, and adaptation of news to readers’ political preferences," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 28-38.
    2. Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2017. "Media pluralism and competition," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 255-283, April.
    3. Garcia Pires Armando J., 2020. "Content Provision in the Media Market with Single-Homing and Multi-Homing Consumers," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 43-83, March.
    4. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    5. Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2021. "Net neutrality and content provision," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 569-593, December.

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