Governance structures for public infrastructure projects: Public–private management regimes, contractual forms and innovation

The choice of appropriate governance structures for public infrastructure projects is a major challenge for governments. The extant literature provides ample theoretical support to analyse various public–private management regimes for public infrastructure service delivery, but there is little discussion on the innovation incentives of specific contractual forms and their welfare implications under different management regimes. Our research aims at providing answers to the following research questions: who should manage different tasks in public infrastructure delivery – public, private or public–private partnership (PPP)?; how should these tasks be managed to foster innovation and enhance welfare?. We explore these using a multi-period analytical model that analyses innovation incentives induced by six contractual forms under five management regimes. We derive conditions under which specific governance structures maximise welfare. Our analysis reveals that PPPs induce optimal innovation and maximise welfare if governed through revenue-sharing concessions for user-payment type services and fixed-price annuity type contracts for no-user-payment type services. The risk share of the private partner and the shadow cost of public funds strengthen the case for PPPs while transaction costs weaken it. These results generate novel insights for policymakers to design effective governance structures and set new research directions in public infrastructure governance.