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Loyalty, protocol, bargainer characteristics, and rationality in an experimental investigation of bilateral bargaining in dyads

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  • Michael Spencer

Abstract

This article analyses data from a bargaining experiment where dyads (i.e. two players) bargain over the chances (in terms of lottery tickets) to win a shrinking monetary reward. The analysis models both time-independent and time-dependent measures of rationality, which are derived from the negotiated distribution of lottery tickets, as a function of bargainers' stated loyalty, individual characteristics, and bargaining protocol. Statistical results suggest that constrained self-interest dominates both measures of rationality, which are significantly affected by pre-bargain cheap talk, first-offer restrictions, loyalty, gender, and academic major.

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  • Michael Spencer, 2010. "Loyalty, protocol, bargainer characteristics, and rationality in an experimental investigation of bilateral bargaining in dyads," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(9), pages 895-900.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:9:p:895-900
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850802552283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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