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The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes

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  • Talya Bobick
  • Alastair Smith

Abstract

When national leaders are replaced, the incoming leader often represents different interests to those of his predecessor. Such shifts in national priorities affect both the onset of WTO disputes and the resolution of ongoing disputes. In particular, leader turnover increases the likelihood that a nation will be involved in a WTO dispute as either plaintiff or defendant, and, if a dispute is ongoing, then leader change in a defendant state increases the likelihood of significant concessions by the defendant. The impact of leader change on both the initiation and settlement of disputes is greater in non-democratic states than democratic states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Talya Bobick & Alastair Smith, 2013. "The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 423-445, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:8:y:2013:i:4:p:423-445
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9171-3
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    Cited by:

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    3. Julia Gray & Philip Potter, 2020. "Diplomacy and the Settlement of International Trade Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(7-8), pages 1358-1389, August.
    4. Jing Wu & Hao Li & Keyang Li, 2020. "Local political chief turnover and economic growth: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 441-466, July.
    5. Casper Sakstrup, 2021. "What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 539-553, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WTO; Dispute onset; Dispute resolution; Leader change; F13; F53;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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